Karibská krize

nes (carrying missiles) had to turn back.
The most frequent description of the end of the crisis is following: On the 26th of October Khrushchev sent a telegram to Kennedy and offered to dismantle the sites if the USA would lift the blockade and promise not to invade Cuba. Before Kennedy could reply, another message came demanding also to remove the missiles from Turkey. On the 27/10 a U-2 plane was shot down over Cuba. It seemed that the generals were right, and that the war was inevitable. "I thought I might never live to see another Saturday night." (Robert McNamara) But Kennedy decided to ignore the plane accident and also Khrushchev second letter, and agreed to lift the blockade and not to invade Cuba. Later it was revealed that he also secretly offered to dismantle the missiles in Turkey. In October 28, the agreement was made and the crisis finished after 13 days. One month later the Russians removed the missiles and Kennedy raised the blockade.
On the other hand Peter Kornbluh and Lawrence Chang argue that:
The recently declassified Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence published here, reveals that no such U.S. commitment was made. Khrushchev repeatedly urged Kennedy to "formalize through the U.N." a noninvasion pledge to end the crisis. The letters show Kennedy repeatedly refused, citing the Soviets' inability to meet U.S. inspection and verification demands. Highly classified State Department memoranda, released in April 1992 to the National Security Archive, reveal the Kennedy administration's internal arguments against finalizing an agreement on the crisis: a settlement would limit the United States in its ongoing efforts to overthrow Fidel Castro. In the end, U.S. officials preferred free rein to intervene in Cuba over an international accord that would settle the Cuban missile crisis.
Only thirty years later, it was discovered how close the world was to nuclear war. In 1992 president Kennedy's administration members, Soviet politicians and Cuban delegation met at a conference in Havana and discussed the crisis. Soviet General Anatoly Gribkov informed participants that, in addition to their intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the Soviets had deployed nine tactical missiles in Cuba to be used against any U.S. invasion force. Even more significant, General Gribkov stated that Soviet field commanders in Cuba had the authority to fire those tactical nuclear weapons without further direction from the Kremlin!
Oracle ThinkQuest; Wiersma, K. and Larson, B.: Fourteen Days in October: The Cuban Missile Crisis.
Shevchenko, A.N.: Breaking with Moscow. p. 116 - 117.
Spartakus; article The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962.
Kennedy, R.F.: Thirteen Days, a Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. p. 2
The Cosmos Club; Nitze, P.H.: Reflection on the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Caridi, R.J.: 20th Century American Foreign Policy: Security and Self-Interest. p. 324.
The George Washington University; Kornbluh, P. and Chang, L.: Introduction to a National Security Archive Documents Reader.
Spartacus; article Cuban Missile Crisis 1962.
Oracle ThinkQuest; Wiersma, K. and Larson, B.: Fourteen Days in October: The Cuban Missile Crisis.
Oracle ThinkQuest; Wiersma, K. and Larson, B.: Fourteen Days in October: The Cuban Missile Crisis.
The George Washington University; Kornbluh, P. and Chang, L.: Introduction to a National Security Archive Documents Reader.
The George Washington University; Kornbluh, P. and Chang, L.: Introduction to a National Security Archive Documents Reader.