Karibská krize

anticipated that the Russians would deploy surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in Cuba.
On the other hand Paul H. Nitze, an Under Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, writes in his Reflection on the Cuban Missile Crisis :
When in mid–October reconnaissance photos revealed that the Soviets were building missiles and bomber bases in Cuba, I was not surprised. Since July, there had been an increase in shipping from Soviet ports to Mariel in Cuba. On October 11, the French reported that their diplomats had seen trucks loaded with what appeared to be tarpaulin– covered missiles lumbering through Havana at night. I thought it probable that these were indeed offensive missiles, despite Soviet pledges that they would never put bases in Cuba and only defensive weapons.
At least the U.S. president and his advisors probably knew about the missile deployment but they underestimated the threat which they meant for the US security. Ronald R. Caridi describes this in his book on American foreign policy:
At first, U-2 surveillance flights revealed the construction of so-called surface-to-air missile sites, but their importance was discounted because of their relatively short range. But in mid-October these U-2 photos disclosed construction of sites for medium-range missiles capable of travelling approximately 1,000 miles.
The EX-COMM discussed the ways to deal with this crisis, and Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara outlined three possible courses of action for the president:
1) "the political course of action" of openly approaching Castro, Khrushchev, and U.S. allies in a gambit to resolve the crisis diplomatically, an option that McNamara and others considered unlikely to succeed
2) "a course of action that would involve declaration of open surveillance" coupled with "a blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba"
3) "military action" directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the missiles
General Thomas Power, a head of Strategic Air Command, and Curtis LeMay, a U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, strongly recommended the military action. According to them Soviets were catching up with Americans in the nuclear arms race, and not answering by use of military power would signal that the U.S.A. were losing the battle. They favoured war rather than to risk the balance of power. But McNamara opposed to them and argued that it was not possible to predict what would happen if they would attack Cuba. The invasion would be too hazardous and that is why he advised the president to initiate a naval blockade. John F. Kennedy agreed.
In October 22, 1962 he made a speech to the nation on the radio and television about the crisis and the solution to it:
… This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. … To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back.
The naval blockade was a successful tactic. When the Soviet ships reached it, only an oil ship was allowed through. The other o