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Some argue that multiculturalism is a policy
of conserving cultures, even practices that vio-
late human rights, and that movements for cul-
tural recognition are not governed democratically.
But neither cultural freedom nor respect for di-
versity should be confused with the defence of
tradition. Cultural liberty is the capability of
people to live and be what they choose, with
adequate opportunity to consider other options.
“Culture”, “tradition” and “authenticity”
are not the same as “cultural liberty”. They are
not acceptable reasons for allowing practices that
deny individuals equality of opportunity and vi-
olate their human rights—such as denying
women equal rights to education.
Interest groups led by self-appointed lead-
ers may not reflect the views of the membership
at large. It is not rare for groups to be dominated
by people who have an interest in maintaining
the status quo under the justification of “tradi-
tion” and who act as gatekeepers of tradition-
alism to freeze their cultures. Those making
demands for cultural accommodation should
also abide by democratic principles and the ob-
jectives of human freedom and human rights.
One good model is the Sami people in Finland,
who enjoy autonomy in a parliament that has de-
mocratic structures and follows democratic pro-
cedures but is part of the Finnish state.
There does not need to be any trade-off be-
tween respect for cultural difference and human
rights and development. But the process of de-
velopment involves active participation of people
in fighting for human rights and shifts in values.
Myth 4. Ethnically diverse countries are
less able to develop, so there is a trade-off
between respecting diversity and promot-
ing development.
No. There is no evidence of a clear relation-
ship, good or bad, between cultural diversity and
development.
Some argue, however, that diversity has
been an obstacle to development. But while it
is undeniably true that many diverse societies
have low levels of income and human develop-
ment, there is no evidence that this is related to
cultural diversity. One study argues that diver-
sity has been a source of poor economic per-
formance in Africa—but this is related to
political decision-making that follows ethnic
rather than national interests, not to diversity it-
self. Just as there are multi-ethnic countries that
have stagnated, there are others that were spec-
tacularly successful. Malaysia, with 62% of its
people Malays and other indigenous groups,
30% Chinese and 8% Indian, was the world’s
10th fastest growing economy during 1970–90,
years when it also implemented affirmative ac-
tion policies. Mauritius ranks 64 in the human
development index, the highest in Sub-Saharan
Africa. It has a diverse population of African,
Indian, Chinese and European origin—with
50% Hindu, 30% Christian and 17% Muslim.
Myth 5. Some cultures are more likely to
make developmental progress than oth-
ers, and some cultures have inherent de-
mocratic values while others do not, so
there is a trade-off between accommodat-
ing certain cultures and promoting devel-
opment and democracy.
Again, no. There is no evidence from sta-
tistical analysis or historical studies of a causal
Cultural liberty is the
capability of people to live
and be what they choose
OVERVIEW 5
relationship between culture and economic
progress or democracy.
Cultural determinism—the idea that a
group’s culture explains economic performance
and the advance of democracy—as an obstacle
or a facilitator, has enormous intuitive appeal.
But these theories are not supported by econo-
metric analysis or history.
Many theories of cultural determinism have
been advanced, starting with Max Weber’s ex-
planation of the Protestant ethic as a key factor
behind successful growth in capitalist economies.
Persuasive in explaining the past, these theories
have been repeatedly proven wrong in predict-
ing the future. When Weber’s theory of the
Protestant ethic was being touted, Catholic coun-
tries (France and Italy) were growing faster than
Protestant Britain and Germany, so the theory
was expanded to mean Christian or Western.
When Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand
and other East Asian countries achieved record
growth rates, the notion that Confucian values
retard growth had to be jettisoned.
Understanding cultural traditions can offer
insights to human behaviour and social dy-
namics that influence development outcomes.
But these insights do not offer a grand theory
of culture and development. In explaining eco-
nomic growth rates, for example, economic pol-
icy, geography and the burden of disease are
found to be highly relevant factors. But cul-
ture, such as whether a society is Hindu or Mus-
lim, is found to be insignificant.
The same is true with reference to democracy.
A new wave of cultural determinism is starting
to hold sway in some policy debates, attributing
the failures of democratization in the non-West-
ern world to inherent cultural traits of intolerance
and “authoritarian values”. At the global level
some theorists have argued that the 21st century
will see a “clash of civilizations”, that the future
of democratic and tolerant Western states is
threatened by non-Western states with more au-
thoritarian values. There are reasons to be scep-
tical. For one thing, the theory exaggerates the
differences between “civilization” groups and
ignores the similarities among them.
Moreover, the West has no monopoly on
democracy or tolerance, and there is no unique
line of historical division between a tolerant
and democratic West and a despotic East. Plato
and Augustine were no less authoritarian in
their thinking than were Confucius and Kautilya.
There were champions of democracy not just in
Europe but elsewhere as well. Take Akbar, who
preached religious tolerance in 16th century
India, or Prince Shotoku who in 7th century
Japan introduced the constitution (kempo) that
insisted that “decisions on important matters
should not be made by one person alone. They
should be discussed by many”. Notions of par-
ticipatory decision-making on important pub-
lic issues have been a central part of many
traditions in Africa and elsewhere. And more re-
cent findings of the World Values survey show
that people in Muslim countries have as much
support for democratic values as do people in
non-Muslim countries.
A basic problem with these theories is the
underlying assumption that culture is largely
fixed and unchanging, allowing the world to be
neatly divided into “civilizations” or “cultures”.
This ignores the fact that while there can be great
continuity in values and traditions in societies,
cultures also change and are rarely homoge-
neous. Nearly all societies have undergone shifts
in values—for example, shifts in values about
the role of women and gender equality over
the last century. And radical changes in social
practices have occurred everywhere, from
Catholics in Chile to Muslims in Bangladesh to
Buddhists in Thailand. Such changes and ten-
sions within societies drive politics and histor-
ical change, so that the way power relationships
affect those dynamics now dominates research
in anthropology. Paradoxically, just as anthro-
pologists have discarded the concept of cul-
ture as a bounded and fixed social phenomenon,
mainstream political interest in finding core
values and traits of “a people and their cul-
ture” is growing.
Theories of cultural determinism deserve
critical assessment since they have dangerous
policy implications. They can fuel support for
nationalistic policies that denigrate or oppress
“inferior” cultures argued to stand in the way
of national unity, democracy and development.
Such attacks on cultural values would then fuel
violent reactions that could feed tensions both
within and between nations.
A new wave of cultural
determinism is starting to
hold sway
6 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004
Human development requires more than
health, education, a decent standard of living
and political freedom. People’s cultural iden-
tities must be recognized and accommodated
by the state, and people must be free to ex-
press these identities without being dis-
criminated against in other aspects of their
lives. In short: cultural liberty is a human
right and an important aspect of human
development—and thus worthy of state ac-
tion and attention.
Human development is the process of widen-
ing choices for people to do and be what they
value in life. Previous Human Development
Reports have focused on expanding social, po-
litical and economic opportunities to expand
these choices. They have explored ways that
policies of equitable growth, expansion of so-
cial opportunities and deepening of democracy
can enhance those choices for all people.
A further dimension of human develop-
ment, difficult to measure and even to define,
is vitally important: cultural liberty is central to
the capability of people to live as they would like.
The advance of cultural liberty must be a cen-
tral aspect of human development, and this re-
quires going beyond social, political and
economic opportunities since they do not guar-
antee cultural liberty.
Cultural liberty is about allowing people
the freedom to choose their identities—and to
lead the lives they value—without being ex-
cluded from other choices important to them
(such as those for education, health or job op-
portunities). In practice there are two forms of
cultural exclusion. First is living mode exclusion,
which denies recognition and accommodation
of a lifestyle that a group would choose to have
and that insists that individuals must live exactly
like all others in society. Examples include re-
ligious oppression or the insistence that immi-
grants drop their cultural practices and language.
Second is participation exclusion, when people
are discriminated against or suffer disadvan-
tage in social, political and economic opportu-
nities because of their cultural identity.
Both types of exclusion exist on an exten-
sive scale, across every continent, at every level
of development, in democracies and authori-
tarian states. The Minorities at Risk data set,
a research project including issues relating to cul-
tural exclusion that has reviewed the situation
of minority groups worldwide, estimates that
about 900 million people belong to groups that
are subject to some form of either living mode
or participation exclusion not faced by other
groups in the state—around one in every seven
people around the world.
Of course, suppressions of cultural liberty
fill the spectrum. At one extreme is ethnic
cleansing. Then there are formal restrictions on
the practice of religion, language and citizenship.
But more frequently cultural exclusion comes
from a simple lack of recognition or respect for
the culture and heritage of people—or from
some cultures being considered inferior, prim-
itive or uncivilized. This can be reflected in
state policies, as in national calendars that do not
observe a minority’s religious holiday, school-
books that leave out or belittle the achieve-
ments of minority leaders and support to
literature and other arts that celebrate the
achievements of the dominant culture.
Living mode exclusion often overlaps with
social, economic and political exclusion through
discrimination and disadvantage in employment,
housing, schooling and political representation.
The occupational castes in Nepal have under-five
mortality rates of more than 17%, compared
with around 7% for the Newar and Brahmin. In
Serbia and Montenegro 30% of Roma children
have never attended primary school. Latin Amer-
icans of European descent often express pride
that they are colour blind and insist that their
states are too. But across the continent indige-
nous groups are poorer and less represented
politically than the non-indigenous. In Mexico,
for example, 81% of indigenous people are reck-
oned to have incomes below the poverty line,
compared with 18% for the general population.
Living mode and participation exclusion,
however, do not always overlap. People of Chi-
nese ancestry in South-East Asia, for example, are
economically dominant yet have been culturally
excluded, for example, with Chinese language
schools restricted, publishing in Chinese pro-
hibited and people of Chinese descent socially
pressured to adopt local names. But more often
Cultural liberty is a
human right and an
important aspect of
human development—
and thus worthy of state
action and attention
OVERVIEW 7
living mode exclusion reinforces exclusion from
other opportunities. This is particularly so for
language. Many groups, especially large minori-
ties such as the Kurds in Turkey and the in-
digenous people of Guatemala, are excluded
from political participation and economic op-
portunities because the state does not recognize
their language in schools, law courts and other
official arenas. This is why groups fight so hard
for their languages to be recognized and used in
instruction and in political and legal processes.
None of this is utopian. Incorporating
multicultural policies is not always easy.
Democracy, equitable development and state
cohesion are essential, and many countries are
successfully developing multicultural poli-
cies to address cultural exclusion.
Cultural liberty will not just happen, any more
than health, education and gender equity just
happen. Fostering it should be a core concern
of governments, even where there are no explicit
policies of persecution or discrimination.
Some argue that guaranteeing individuals
civil and political rights—such as freedom of
worship, speech and association—is enough to
give them the ability to practice their religion,
speak their language and be free of discrimi-
nation in employment, schooling and many
other types of exclusion. They argue that cul-
tural exclusion is a by-product of economic
and political exclusions and that once these are
resolved, the cultural exclusion will disappear
of its own accord.
This has not happened. Many rich and de-
mocratic countries, for example, profess to treat
all citizens equally, but are nonetheless home to
minorities who lack proper representation in pol-
itics, and for whom harassment and difficulty in
accessing public services are their daily fare.
To expand cultural freedoms requires explicit
policies to address denials of cultural liberty—
multicultural policies. To do this, states need to
recognize cultural differences in their constitu-
tions, their laws and their institutions. They also
need to formulate policies to ensure that the in-
terests of particular groups—whether minorities
or historically marginalized majorities—are not
ignored or overridden by the majority or by
dominant groups. And they need to do so in
ways that do not contradict other goals and
strategies of human development, such as con-
solidating democracy, building a capable state
and ensuring equal opportunities to all citizens.
This is not easy, but there are many examples
of countries around the world adopting innov-
ative approaches for managing cultural diversity.
This Report focuses particularly on five central
policy areas: political participation, religion, ac-
cess to justice, language and access to socio-
economic opportunities.
Policies for ensuring political participation
Many historically marginalized groups are still
excluded from real political power, and so they
often feel alienated from the state. In some cases
the exclusion is due to a lack of democracy or
the denial of political rights. If so, democrati-
zation would be an essential first step. However,
something more is required, because even when
members of minorities have equal political rights
in a democracy, they may be consistently un-
derrepresented or outvoted, and so view the
central government as alien and oppressive.
Not surprisingly, many minorities resist alien or
oppressive rule and seek more political power.
That is why a “multicultural” conception of
democracy is often required.
Several emerging models of multicultural
democracy provide effective mechanisms for
power sharing between culturally diverse groups.
These kinds of power-sharing arrangements are
crucial for securing the rights of diverse cul-
tural groups and minorities and for preventing
violations—either by majoritarian imposition
or by the dominance of the ruling political elite.
Electoral reforms addressed the chronic
underrepresentation of Maoris in New Zealand.
With the introduction of proportional repre-
sentation in place of the winner-takes-all for-
mula, Maori representation rose from 3% in
1993 to 16% in the 2002 elections, in line with
their share of the population. Reserved seats
and quotas have been critical to ensuring that
the scheduled tribes and castes had a voice in
India and that ethnic minorities were repre-
sented in Croatia.
Several emerging models
of multicultural democracy
provide effective
mechanisms for power
sharing between culturally
diverse groups
8 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004
Federal arrangements are an important ap-
proach to power sharing. Almost every one of
the dozen ethnically diverse countries that are
longstanding democracies has asymmetrical fed-
eral arrangements in which subunits of the fed-
eral state do not all have the same powers. This
arrangement responds more flexibly to the needs
of different groups. For example, Sabah and
Sarawak have a special status in Malaysia, as do
the Basques and 14 other comunidades auto-
nomas in Spain, with autonomy in areas such
as education, language and culture.
Some indigenous people, such as the Inuits
in Canada, have also negotiated self-governing ter-
ritories. The lesson is that such power sharing
arrangements have broadly proven to be critical
in resolving tensions in countries historically
confronted with secessionist movements, as in
Spain. Introduced early enough, when tensions
are mounting, they can forestall violent conflict.
Policies for ensuring religious freedom
Many religious minorities suffer various forms
of exclusion, sometimes due to explicit sup-
pression of religious freedom or discrimination
against that group—a problem particularly com-
mon in non-secular countries where the state up-
holds an established religion.
But in other cases the exclusion may be less
direct and often unintended, as when the pub-
lic calendar does not recognize a minority’s re-
ligious holidays. India officially celebrates 5
Hindu holidays but also 4 Muslim, 2 Christian,
1 Buddhist, 1 Jain and 1 Sikh in recognition of
a diverse population. France celebrates 11 na-
tional holidays, 5 are non-denominational and
of the 6 religious holidays all celebrate events in
the Christian calendar, though 7% of the pop-
ulation is Muslim and 1% Jewish. Similarly, the
dress codes in public institutions may conflict
with a minority’s religious dress. Or state rules
about marriage and inheritance may differ from
those of religious codes. Or zoning regulations
may be at odds with a minority’s burial practices.
These sorts of conflicts can arise even in
secular states with strong democratic institutions
that protect civil and political rights. Given the
profound importance of religion to people’s
identities, it is not surprising that religious
minorities often mobilize to contest these ex-
clusions. Some religious practices are not diffi-
cult to accommodate, but often they present
difficult choices and trade-offs. France is grap-
pling with whether headscarves in state schools
violate state principles of secularism and demo-
cratic values of gender equality that state edu-
cation aims to impart. Nigeria is struggling with
whether to uphold the ruling of a Sharia court
in a case of adultery.
What is important from the human devel-
opment perspective is to expand human free-
doms and human rights—and to recognize
equality. Secular and democratic states are most
likely to achieve these goals where the state pro-
vides reasonable accommodation of religious
practices, where all religions have the same re-
lation to the state and where the state protects
human rights.
Policies for legal pluralism
In many multicultural societies indigenous peo-
ple and people from other cultural groups have
pressed for recognition of their traditional legal
systems to gain access to justice. For example,
the Maya in Guatemala suffered centuries of op-
pression, and the state legal system became part
of their oppression. The communities lost faith
in the state system of rule of law, because it did
not secure justice and because it was not em-
bedded in the society and its values.
Several countries such as Guatemala, India
and South Africa are developing approaches to
legal pluralism, recognizing the role of the judicial
norms and institutions of the communities in dif-
ferent ways. Demands for legal pluralism meet
opposition from those who fear that it under-
mines the principle of a unified legal system or
that it would promote traditional practices con-
trary to democracy and human rights. For sure,
conflicts do arise—South Africa, for example,
is grappling with the conflict between the rights
of women to inheritance under state constitution
and the rights denied under customary law.
There are real trade-offs societies must
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