Ekonomika

Africans speak 15 core languages 63
3.9 Land rights in the Philippines 68
3.10 Experiences with affirmative action in Malaysia and South Africa 70
4.1 Leadership, ideological manipulation and recruiting supporters 77
4.2 Central Asia—the danger in restricting political and cultural liberties 78
4.3 Egypt—distinguishing between moderates and extremists 80
4.4 Algeria—discontent, democraticization and violence 81
4.5 United States—targeting intolerance and hatred 83
5.1 Culture—paradigm shift in anthropology 89
5.2 Sources of global ethics 90
5.3 Private companies and indigenous people can work together for development 94
5.4 Using intellectual property rights to protect traditional knowledge 95
5.5 The debate on cultural goods and the Multilateral Agreement on Investments fiasco 96
5.6 France’s successful support of domestic cultural industries 99
5.7 The headscarf dilemma in France 101
5.8 Temporary contracts—welcoming workers but not people does not work 103
5.9 How Berlin promotes respect for cultural difference 104
TABLES
2.1 Political representation of ethnic minorities in selected OECD parliaments 35
2.2 Integrating multicultural policies into human development strategies 37
xii
3.1 Indicators of internal output and costs of conventional and bilingual schools in Burkina Faso 62
4.1 Casualties resulting from sectarian violence in Pakistan, 1989–2003 75
5.1 Indigenous population in Latin America 92
5.2 Policy choices for the promotion of the domestic film and audiovisual industry—market and industry size matter 98
5.3 Top 10 cities by share of foreign born population, 2000/01 99
FIGURES
2.1 Most countries are culturally diverse 28
2.2 Indigenous people can expect a shorter life 29
2.3 Europe’s non-European migrant population has increased significantly . . . and migrants are
coming from more places 30
2.4 Many lack access to primary education in their mother tongue 34
2.5 National holidays are important ways to recognize—or ignore—cultural identities 35
3.1 Indigenous people are more likely than non-indigenous people to be poor in Latin America 67
3.2 Non-whites benefit less than whites from public health spending in South Africa 67
3.3 Group inequalities have declined in Malaysia, but personal inequalities have not 71
3.4 The record of affirmative action in the United States is mixed 71
4.1 Movements for cultural domination—not the same as all fundamentalist or all violent movements 73
4.2 Some European extreme right parties have won steadily increasing vote shares 74
4.3 Democratic participation can expose the fringe appeal of extreme right parties 82
5.1 Top-grossing films of all time at the international (non-US) box office were US films, April 2004 97
5.2 Unprecedented growth in international migration to Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand, but
refugees remain a small proportion, 1990–2000 100
5.3 More and more governments (rich and poor) want to control immigration, 1976–2001 100
MAPS
2.1 Guatemala exhibits substantial overlap between linguistic communities and social exclusion 37
5.1 Much extractive and infrastructural activity in developing countries is in areas where indigenous people live 92
FEATURES
2.1 The Minorities at Risk data set—quantifying cultural exclusion 32
Figure 1 Discrimination and disadvantage of culturally identified groups can be cultural, political and economic—
with considerable overlap 32
Figure 2 Political and economic exclusion have different causes 32
3.1 State unity or ethnocultural identity? Not an inevitable choice 48
Figure 1 Multiple and complementary identities 48
Figure 2 Trust, support and identification: poor and diverse countries can do well with multicultural policies 49
5.1 What’s new about globalization’s implications for identity politics? 86
Table 1 Top 10 countries by share of migrant population, 2000 87
Figure 1 Rapid increases in investments in extractive industries in developing countries, 1988–97 86
Figure 2 Fewer domestic films, more US films: evolving film attendance, 1984–2001 87
Statistical feature 1 The state of human development 127
Table 1 HDI, HPI-1, HPI-2, GDI—same components, different measurements 127
Table 2 Eliminating poverty: massive deprivation remains, 2000 129
xiii
Table 3 Progress and setbacks: child mortality 132
Table 4 Progress and setbacks: primary education 132
Table 5 Progress and setbacks: income poverty 132
Table 6 Countries experiencing a drop in the human development index, 1980s and 1990s 132
Figure 1 Same HDI, different income 128
Figure 2 Same income, different HDI 128
Figure 3 Not enough progress towards the Millennium Development Goals 130
Figure 4 Timeline: when will the Millennium Development Goals be achieved if progress does not accelerate? 133
Figure 5 Global disparities in HDI 134
Figure 6 Top and high priority countries 134
Index to Millennium Development Goal indicators in the indicator tables 135
Statistical feature 2 Note to table 1: About this year’s human development index 137
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
MONITORING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: ENLARGING PEOPLE’S CHOICES. . .
1 Human development index 139
2 Human development index trends 143
3 Human and income poverty: developing countries 147
4 Human and income poverty: OECD, Central & Eastern Europe & CIS 150
. . . TO LEAD A LONG AND HEALTHY LIFE. . .
5 Demographic trends 152
6 Commitment to health: resources, access and services 156
7Water, sanitation and nutritional status 160
8 Leading global health crises and risks 164
9 Survival: progress and setbacks 168
. . . TO ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE . . .
10 Commitment to education: public spending 172
11 Literacy and enrolment 176
12 Technology: diffusion and creation 180
. . . TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES NEEDED FOR A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING. . .
13 Economic performance 184
14 Inequality in income or consumption 188
15 Structure of trade 192
16 Rich country responsibilities: aid 196
17 Rich country responsibilities: debt relief and trade 197
18 Flows of aid, private capital and debt 198
19 Priorities in public spending 202
20 Unemployment in OECD countries 206
. . . WHILE PRESERVING IT FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS . . .
21 Energy and the environment 207
xiv
. . . PROTECTING PERSONAL SECURITY . . .
22 Refugees and armaments 211
23 Victims of crime 215
. . . AND ACHIEVING EQUALITY FOR ALL WOMEN AND MEN
24 Gender-related development index 217
25 Gender empowerment measure 221
26 Gender inequality in education 225
27 Gender inequality in economic activity 229
28 Gender, work burden and time allocation 233
29 Women’s political participation 234
HUMAN AND LABOUR RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
30 Status of major international human rights instruments 238
31 Status of fundamental labour rights conventions 242
32 Human development indices: a regional perspective 246
33 Basic indicators for other UN member countries 250
Note on statistics in the Human Development Report 251
Technical notes
1 Calculating the human development indices 258
2 Identifying top priority and high priority countries for the Millennium Development Goals 265
Definitions of statistical terms 268
Statistical references 277
Classification of countries 279
Index to indicators 283
OVERVIEW 1
How will the new constitution of Iraq satisfy de-
mands for fair representation for Shiites and
Kurds? Which—and how many—of the lan-
guages spoken in Afghanistan should the new
constitution recognize as the official language of
the state? How will the Nigerian federal court
deal with a Sharia law ruling to punish adultery
by death? Will the French legislature approve
the proposal to ban headscarves and other re-
ligious symbols in public schools? Do Hispan-
ics in the United States resist assimilation into
the mainstream American culture? Will there be
a peace accord to end fighting in Côte d’Ivoire?
Will the President of Bolivia resign after mount-
ing protests by indigenous people? Will the
peace talks to end the Tamil-Sinhala conflict in
Sri Lanka ever conclude? These are just some
headlines from the past few months. Managing
cultural diversity is one of the central challenges
of our time.
Long thought to be divisive threats to social
harmony, choices like these—about recognizing
and accommodating diverse ethnicities, reli-
gions, languages and values—are an inescapable
feature of the landscape of politics in the 21st
century. Political leaders and political theorists
of all persuasions have argued against explicit
recognition of cultural identities—ethnic, reli-
gious, linguistic, racial. The result, more often
than not, has been that cultural identities have
been suppressed, sometimes brutally, as state
policy—through religious persecutions and eth-
nic cleansings, but also through everyday ex-
clusion and economic, social and political
discrimination.
New today is the rise of identity politics. In
vastly different contexts and in different ways—
from indigenous people in Latin America to
religious minorities in South Asia to ethnic mi-
norities in the Balkans and Africa to immigrants
in Western Europe—people are mobilizing
anew around old grievances along ethnic,
religious, racial and cultural lines, demanding
that their identities be acknowledged, appreci-
ated and accommodated by wider society. Suf-
fering discrimination and marginalization from
social, economic and political opportunities,
they are also demanding social justice. Also new
today is the rise of coercive movements that
threaten cultural liberty. And, in this era of
globalization, a new class of political claims and
demands has emerged from individuals, com-
munities and countries feeling that their local cul-
tures are being swept away. They want to keep
their diversity in a globalized world.
Why these movements today? They are not
isolated. They are part of a historic process of
social change, of struggles for cultural freedom,
of new frontiers in the advance of human free-
doms and democracy. They are propelled and
shaped by the spread of democracy, which is giv-
ing movements more political space for protest,
and the advance of globalization, which is cre-
ating new networks of alliances and presenting
new challenges.
Cultural liberty is a vital part of human de-
velopment because being able to choose one’s
identity—who one is—without losing the re-
spect of others or being excluded from other
choices is important in leading a full life. People
want the freedom to practice their religion openly,
to speak their language, to celebrate their ethnic
or religious heritage without fear of ridicule or
punishment or diminished opportunity. People
want the freedom to participate in society with-
out having to slip off their chosen cultural moor-
ings. It is a simple idea, but profoundly unsettling.
States face an urgent challenge in respond-
ing to these demands. If handled well, greater
recognition of identities will bring greater cul-
tural diversity in society, enriching people’s
lives. But there is also a great risk.
These struggles over cultural identity, if left
unmanaged or managed poorly, can quickly
Cultural liberty in today’s diverse world
OVERVIEW
Cultural liberty is a vital
part of human
development
2 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004
become one of the greatest sources of instability
within states and between them—and in so doing
trigger conflict that takes development back-
wards. Identity politics that polarize people and
groups are creating fault lines between “us” and
“them”. Growing distrust and hatred threaten
peace, development and human freedoms. Just
in the last year ethnic violence destroyed hundreds
of homes and mosques in Kosovo and Serbia. Ter-
rorist train bombings in Spain killed nearly 200.
Sectarian violence killed thousands of Muslims
and drove thousands more from their homes in
Gujarat and elsewhere in India, a champion of cul-
tural accommodation. A spate of hate crimes
against immigrants shattered Norwegians’ belief
in their unshakable commitment to tolerance.
Struggles over identity can also lead to re-
gressive and xenophobic policies that retard
human development. They can encourage a re-
treat to conservatism and a rejection of change,
closing off the infusion of ideas and of people
who bring cosmopolitan values and the know-
ledge and skills that advance development.
Managing diversity and respecting cultural
identities are not just challenges for a few “multi-
ethnic states”. Almost no country is entirely
homogeneous. The world’s nearly 200 coun-
tries contain some 5,000 ethnic groups. Two-
thirds have at least one substantial minority—an
ethnic or religious group that makes up at least
10% of the population.
At the same time the pace of international
migration has quickened, with startling effects
on some countries and cities. Nearly half the
population of Toronto was born outside of
Canada. And many more foreign-born people
maintain close ties with their countries of ori-
gin than did immigrants of the last century.
One way or another every country is a multi-
cultural society today, containing ethnic, reli-
gious or linguistic groups that have common
bonds to their own heritage, culture, values
and way of life.
Cultural diversity is here to stay—and to
grow. States need to find ways of forging national
unity amid this diversity. The world, ever more
interdependent economically, cannot function
unless people respect diversity and build unity
through common bonds of humanity. In this
age of globalization the demands for cultural
recognition can no longer be ignored by any
state or by the international community. And con-
frontations over culture and identity are likely to
grow—the ease of communications and travel
have shrunk the world and changed the landscape
of cultural diversity, and the spread of democ-
racy, human rights and new global networks
have given people greater means to mobilize
around a cause, insist on a response and get it.
Five myths debunked. Policies recognizing
cultural identities and encouraging diversity
to flourish do not result in fragmentation,
conflict, weak development or authoritarian
rule. Such policies are both viable, and nec-
essary, for it is often the suppression of cul-
turally identified groups that leads to tensions.
This Report makes a case for respecting diver-
sity and building more inclusive societies by
adopting policies that explicitly recognize cul-
tural differences—multicultural policies. But
why have many cultural identities been sup-
pressed or ignored for so long? One reason is
that many people believe that allowing diversity
to flourish may be desirable in the abstract but
in practice can weaken the state, lead to conflict
and retard development. The best approach to
diversity, in this view, is assimilation around a
single national standard, which can lead to the
suppression of cultural identities. However, this
Report argues that these are not premises—
they are myths. Indeed, it argues that a multi-
cultural policy approach is not just desirable but
also viable and necessary. Without such an ap-
proach the imagined problems of diversity can
become self-fulfilling prophecies.
Myth 1. People’s ethnic identities com-
pete with their attachment to the state, so
there is a trade-off between recognizing di-
versity and unifying the state.
Not so. Individuals can and do have multiple
identities that are complementary—ethnicity,
language, religion and race as well as citizenship.
Nor is identity a zero sum game. There is no in-
evitable need to choose between state unity and
recognition of cultural differences.
This Report makes a case
for respecting diversity
and building more
inclusive societies by
adopting policies that
explicitly recognize
cultural differences—
multicultural policies
OVERVIEW 3
A sense of identity and belonging to a group
with shared values and other bonds of culture
is important for individuals. But each individ-
ual can identify with many different groups. In-
dividuals have identity of citizenship (for
example, being French), gender (being a
woman), race (being of West African origin), lan-
guage (being fluent in Thai, Chinese and Eng-
lish), politics (having left-wing views) and
religion (being Buddhist).
Identity also has an element of choice: within
these memberships individuals can choose what
priority to give to one membership over an-
other in different contexts. Mexican Americans
may cheer for the Mexican soccer team but
serve in the US Army. Many white South
Africans chose to fight apartheid as South
Africans. Sociologists tell us that people have
boundaries of identity that separate “us” from
“them”, but these boundaries shift and blur to
incorporate broader groups of people.
“Nation building” has been a dominant ob-
jective of the 20th century, and most states have
aimed to build culturally homogeneous states
with singular identities. Sometimes they suc-
ceeded but at the cost of repression and perse-
cution. If the history of the 20th century showed
anything, it is that the attempt either to exter-
minate cultural groups or to wish them away elic-
its a stubborn resilience. By contrast, recognizing
cultural identities has resolved never-ending
tensions. For both practical and moral reasons,
then, it is far better to accommodate cultural
groups than to try to eliminate them or to pre-
tend that they do not exist.
Countries do not have to choose between na-
tional unity and cultural diversity. Surveys show
that the two can and often do coexist. In Bel-
gium citizens overwhelmingly replied when
asked that they felt both Belgian and Flemish or
Walloon and in Spain, that they felt Spanish as
well as Catalan or Basque.
These countries and others have worked
hard to accommodate diverse cultures. They
have also worked hard to build unity by fostering
respect for identities and trust in state institu-
tions. The states have held together. Immigrants
need not deny their commitment to their fam-
ilies in their countries of origin when they de-
velop loyalties to their new countries. Fears that
if immigrants do not “assimilate”, they will frag-
ment the country are unfounded. Assimilation
without choice is no longer a viable—or a
necessary—model of integration.
There is no trade-off between diversity and
state unity. Multicultural policies are a way to
build diverse and unified states.
Myth 2. Ethnic groups are prone to violent
conflict with each other in clashes of val-
ues, so there is a trade-off between re-
specting diversity and sustaining peace.
No. There is little empirical evidence that cul-
tural differences and clashes over values are in
themselves a cause of violent conflict.
It is true, particularly since the end of the
cold war, that violent conflicts have arisen not
so much between states but within them be-
tween ethnic groups. But on their causes, there
is wide agreement in recent research by schol-
ars that cultural differences by themselves are
not the relevant factor. Some even argue that cul-
tural diversity reduces the risk of conflict by mak-
ing group mobilization more difficult.
Studies offer several explanations for these
wars: economic inequalities between the groups
as well as struggles over political power, land and
other economic assets. In Fiji indigenous Fijians
initiated a coup against the Indian-dominated
government because they feared that land might
be confiscated. In Sri Lanka the Sinhalese ma-
jority gained political power, but the Tamil mi-
nority had access to more economic resources,
triggering decades of civil conflict. In Burundi and
Rwanda, at different points in time, Tutsis and
Hutus were each excluded from economic op-
portunities and political participation.
Cultural identity does have a role in these
conflicts—not as a cause but as a driver for po-
litical mobilization. Leaders invoke a single
identity, its symbols and its history of griev-
ances, to “rally the troops”. And a lack of cul-
tural recognition can trigger violent mobilization.
Underlying inequalities in South Africa were
at the root of the Soweto riots in 1976, but they
were triggered by attempts to impose Afrikaans
on black schools.
While the coexistence of culturally distinct
groups is not, in itself, a cause of violent conflict,
A sense of identity and
belonging to a group with
shared values and other
bonds of culture is
important for all
individuals. But each
individual can identify
with many different
groups
4 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004
it is dangerous to allow economic and political
inequality to deepen between these groups or to
suppress cultural differences, because cultural
groups are easily mobilized to contest these dis-
parities as injustice.
There is no trade-off between peace and
respect for diversity, but identity politics need
to be managed so that they do not turn violent.
Myth 3. Cultural liberty requires defend-
ing traditional practices, so there could
be a trade-off between recognizing cultural
diversity and other human development
priorities such as progress in development,
democracy and human rights.
No. Cultural liberty is about expanding indi-
vidual choices, not about preserving values and
practices as an end in itself with blind allegiance
to tradition.
Culture is not a frozen set of values and prac-
tices. It is constantly recreated as people ques-
tion, adapt and redefine their values and practices
to changing realit